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Abstract
Recently, Dogan, Dogan and Yildiz (2015) presented a new efficiency notion for
the random assignment setting called SW (social welfare)-efficiency and charac-
terized it. In this note, we generalize the characterization for the more general
domain of randomized social choice.
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1. Introduction
The random assignment setting captures the scenario in which n agents
express preferences over n objects and the outcome is a probabilistic assignment.
For the the setting, two interesting efficiency notions are ex post efficiency and
SD (stochastic dominance)-efficiency [1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10]. The assignment setting
can be considered as a special case of voting where each discrete assignment can
be viewed as a voting alternative [2, 4, 7].
Recently, Dogan et al. [9] presented a new notion of efficiency called SW
(social welfare)-efficiency for the random assignment setting. They characterize
SW-efficiency. In this note, we generalize the characterization to the more
general voting setting.
2. Preliminaries
Consider the social choice setting in which there is a set of agents N =
{1, . . . , n}, a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , am} and a preference profile %=
(%1, . . . ,%n) such that each %i is a complete and transitive relation over A.
We write a %i b to denote that agent i values alternative a at least as much as
alternative b and use≻i for the strict part of%i, i.e., a ≻i b iff a %i b but not b %i
a. Finally, ∼i denotes i’s indifference relation, i.e., a ∼i b iff both a %i b and b %i
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a. The alternatives in A could be any discrete structures: voting outcomes,
house allocation, many-to-many two-sided matching, or coalition structures. A
utility profile u = (u1, . . . , un) specified for each agent i ∈ N his utility for ui(a)
for each alternative a ∈ N . A utility profile is consistent with the preference
profile%, if for each i ∈ N and a, b ∈ A, ui(a) ≥ ui(b) if a %i b. Two alternatives
a, b ∈ A are Pareto indifferent if a ∼i b for all i ∈ N . For any alternative a ∈ A,
we will denote by D(a) the set {b ∈ A : ∃i ∈ N, a ≻i b}.
We will also consider randomized outcomes that are lotteries over A. A
lottery is a probability distribution over A. We denote the set of lotteries by
∆(A). For a lottery p ∈ ∆(A), we denote by p(a) the probability of alternative
a ∈ A in lottery p. We denote by supp(p) the set {a ∈ A : p(a) > 0}. A lottery
p is interesting if there exist a, b ∈ supp(p) such that there exist i, j ∈ N such
that a ≻i b and b ≻j a. A lottery is degenerate if it puts probability one on a
single alternative.
Under stochastic dominance (SD), an agent prefers a lottery that, for each
alternative x ∈ A, has a higher probability of selecting an alternative that
is at least as good as x. Formally, p %SDi q iff ∀y ∈ A :
∑
x∈A:x%iy
p(x) ≥
∑
x∈A:x%iy
q(x). It is well-known that p %SD q iff p yields at least as much
expected utility as q for any von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function consis-
tent with the ordinal preferences [4, 8]. A lottery is SD-efficient if it is Pareto
optimal with respect to the SD relation.
3. SW-efficiency
We now consider SW-efficiency as introduced by Dogan et al. [9]. Although
Dogan et al. [9] defined SW-efficiency in the context of random assignment, the
definition extends in a straightforward manner to the case of voting.
Definition 1 (SW-efficiency). A lottery p is SW-efficient if there exists no
other lottery q that SW dominates it. Lottery q SW dominates p if for any
utility profile for which p maximizes welfare, q maximises welfare, and there
exists at least one utility profile for which q maximised welfare but p does not.
Lemma 1. Consider a Pareto optimal alternative a ∈ A and a non-empty set
D(a) = {b ∈ A : ∃i ∈ N, a ≻i b}. Then, there exists a utility profile u such that∑
i∈N ui(a) >
∑
i∈N ui(b) for all b ∈ D(a).
Proof. We can construct the require utility function profile u as follows. When-
ever a ≻i b, make the difference ui(a) − ui(b) huge. Whenever b ≻j a, make
the difference uj(b) − uj(a) arbitrarily small. Hence the value ui(a) − ui(b) is
large enough that it makes up for all j for which uj(b) − uj(a) > 0. Hence∑
i∈N ui(a)− ui(n) > 0.
Lemma 2. SW-efficiency implies SD-efficiency implies ex post efficiency.
Proof. It is well-known that SD-efficiency implies ex post efficiency [4].
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Consider a lottery p that is not SD-efficient. Then there exists another
lottery q that SD-dominates it. Hence p does not maximize welfare for any
consistent utility profile because q yields more utility for each utility profile.
Lemma 3. An interesting lottery is not SW-efficient.
Proof. If an interesting lottery p is not SD-efficient, we are already done because
by Lemma 2, p is not SW-efficient. So let us assume p is SD-efficient and hence
ex post efficient. Since p is interesting, there exists at least one a ∈ supp(p)
such that a ≻i b for some b ∈ supp(p) and i ∈ N . Note that a is Pareto optimal.
By Lemma 1, there exists a utility profile u such that
∑
i∈N ui(a) >
∑
i∈N ui(b)
for all b ∈ D(a) where D(a) ∩ supp(p) 6= ∅. Hence, there exists a utility profile
u such that
∑
i∈N ui(a) >
∑
i∈N ui(b) for all b ∈ supp(p) ∩ D(a). This means
that
∑
i∈N ui(a) >
∑
i∈N ui(p).
Lemma 4. An uninteresting lottery over Pareto optimal alternatives is SW-
efficient.
Proof. An uninteresting lottery p over Pareto optimal alternatives is SD-
efficient. Assume that there is another lottery q that SW-dominates p. Then
supp(q) contains one alternative b that is not Pareto indifferent to alternatives
supp(p). This means that there exists a utility profile u such that welfare is
maximized by p but not by b. Hence q does not SW-dominate p.
Theorem 1. A lottery is SW-efficient iff it is ex post efficient and uninteresting.
Proof. By Lemma 4, an ex post efficiency and uninteresting lottery is SW-
efficient.
We now prove that if lottery is not ex post efficient or uninteresting, it
not SW-efficient. Due to Lemma 2, if a lottery is not ex post efficient, it is
not SW-efficient. Similarly, by Lemma 3, if a lottery is interesting, it is not
SW-efficient.
Lemma 5. If A contains no Pareto indifferent alternatives, then if a lottery is
uninteresting and not degenerate, then it is not ex post efficient.
Proof. Assume that a lottery p is uninteresting and not degenerate. Since p
is not degenerate, |supp(p)| ≥ 2. Since p is uninteresting, there do not exist
a, b ∈ supp(p) such that there exist i, j ∈ N such that a ≻i b and b ≻j a. Thus
either a Pareto dominates b, or b or Pareto dominates a or a and b are Pareto
indifferent. The third case is not possible because we assumed that A does
not contain Pareto indifferent alternatives. Since a Pareto dominates b or b or
Pareto dominates a, supp(p) contains a Pareto dominated alternative. Hence p
is not ex post efficient.
Theorem 2. If A contains no Pareto indifferent alternatives, then a lottery is
SW-efficient iff it is ex post efficient and degenerate.
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Proof. Assume that A contains no Pareto indifferent alternatives. If a lottery p
is SW-efficient, then by Theorem 1, it is ex post efficient and uninteresting. By
Lemma 5, since p is ex post efficient, it is degenerate.
Now assume that a lottery p is ex post efficient and degenerate. Since p is
degenerate, it is uninteresting by definition. Since it is both ex post efficient
and uninteresting, then by Theorem 1, it is SW-efficient.
Lemma 6. An assignment problem with strict preferences does not admit Pareto
indifferent discrete assignments.
Proof. Consider two discrete assignments M and M ′ such that all agents are
indifferent among them. Then this means that each agent gets the same item
in both M ′ and M ′. But this implies that M ′ = M .
Corollary 1 (Dogan et al. [9]). If preferences are strict, the only undominated
probabilistic assignments are the Pareto efficient deterministic assignments.
Proof. No two discrete assignments are completely indifferent for all agents.
Hence only random assignment that is SW-efficient is a discrete Pareto optimal
assignment.
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